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In the 2015 Asia Lecture at the York Centre for Asian Research 
(YCAR), Dr. Yen Le Espiritu views the Vietnamese refugee flight—
from Vietnam to the Philippines to Guam and then to California, all 
of which routed the refugees through United States (U.S.) military 
bases—as a critical lens through which to map, both discursively and 
materially, the legacy of U.S. military expansion into the Asia Pacific 
region and the military’s heavy hand in the purportedly benevolent 
resettlement process. She makes two related arguments: the first 
about military colonialism, which contends that it was (neo)colonial 
dependence on the U.S. that turned the Philippines and Guam into 
the “logical” receiving centers of the Vietnamese refugees; and the 
second about militarized refuge, which emphasizes the mutually 
constitutive nature of the concepts “refugees” and “refuge” and 
shows how both emerge out of and in turn bolster U.S. militarism.
I wanted to just say a little bit about the connection between 
this talk on Vietnamese refugees and my book, Home Bound 
(Espiritu 2003), that maybe some of you are more familiar with. 
My intellectual, personal and political interest is in thinking 
about the ideological work that the figures of the migrant and 
the refugee do for nation states. I’m speaking in particular about 
U.S. context, but I’d be happy to speculate or to answer your 
questions about Canada, using what I know, during the question 
and answer period. I’m interested in the ways in which the U.S. 
has been able to represent itself ideologically as a nation of 
immigrants, even as we all can recite U.S. history of conquest, of 
colonialism, of militarism, slavery and so on. Ideologically, this 
“nation of immigrants” narrative implies that immigrants come to 
the U.S. voluntarily and that the U.S. is undisputedly a nation of 
opportunities. 
 This “nation of immigrants” narrative, I argue, disables 
us from seeing the many costs of U.S. interventions in Asia. In 
Home Bound, I examined U.S. colonialism in the Philippines, and 
in my new book, Body Counts (Espiritu 2014), I analyzed the U.S. 
war in Vietnam. I’m interested in rethinking these questions: 
Who are the original “border-crossers”? Who has the ability to 
cross borders without permission? And who gets stopped at the 
borders? I live in San Diego at the U.S./Mexico border, where 
these issues are very central. So I’m always thinking about how to 
recast terms such as “border crossers” that are used all the time 
to denigrate migrants of color, how to imbue them with new and 
more critical meaning. 
 In Body Counts (Espiritu 2014), as I will elaborate in my 
talk, I re-conceptualized the notion of the refugee. I wanted to 
think about the refugees from Vietnam, not only in the context 
of Vietnam and the U.S., but in the much larger history of U.S. 
connections and interventions dating back to the Pacific Islands 
but also the Philippines and Vietnam. I will then re-read that 
history differently, using the refugee as a lens. I also wanted to 
hopefully reach out to more people in the audience by having a 
talk that links different spaces in the Asia-Pacific region. 
 The talk today will come from my book Body Counts. A few 
words about the title: “body counts” is meant to refer to the term 
that the U.S. military used during the Vietnam War. I don’t know 
how many of you are familiar with that term. During the war, the 
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This ‘nation of immigrants’ 
narrative … disables us from 
seeing the many costs of U.S. 
interventions in Asia. 
U.S. Army employed “body counts”—the number of confirmed 
Vietnamese kills—to chart U.S. progress in the war. I wanted to 
use this very same term as the book’s title to foreground that this 
was really a very violent encounter. But there is a double meaning. 
I also wanted to use “body counts” to insist that bodies—
Vietnamese bodies—should count. In the U.S., we Americans 
tend to talk about the Vietnam War as what had happened to 
Americans, and I wanted to foreground the Vietnam War as what 
happened to the Vietnamese. 
 The first half of the book focuses more on the history 
of U.S. involvement in Vietnam. The second half focuses on 
Vietnamese refugee memories. I am not going to be discussing 
this in my talk, but I’d be happy to talk about it in the Q&A, in 
particular, what it means for children of Vietnamese refugees to 
grow up with that label and history and yet not have a space in 
the home or elsewhere to discuss what that means. I know for 
Vietnamese Americans, this is a really big question that makes 
it difficult to think about what it means to be Vietnamese in the 
world today, and particularly in the U.S.  I have a chapter that 
looks at what I call “internet memorials”. Since Vietnamese war 
dead aren’t being memorialized in the U.S. at a physical site, I 
looked at what happens online and how Vietnamese memorialize 
themselves and the different web pages that they have erected to 
commemorate these deaths.
 The title of my talk is “Vietnam, the Philippines and 
California: Connecting the Dots of U.S. Military Empire”. I want to 
begin with a newspaper account of a suicide, a murder-suicide, 
in New York. On April 3, 2009, Linh Phat Voong, a 41-year-old 
Chinese-Vietnamese immigrant shot and killed 13 people at the 
American Civic Association and the Immigrants Services Center 
in downtown Binghamton, New York. He then shot and killed 
himself. This was an account I read in the Los Angeles Times. 
The Times article concludes its story on the killing with this 
summation and I quote: “Whatever drove [him] to take his pistols 
to the American Civic Assn. on Friday may never be known” 
(Drogin, Baum and Tran 2009, emphasis added). For me, this 
raises questions, theoretically, of what is knowable and what is 
unknowable, and how those things are constructed, what we are 
taught to know and what we are taught to see. 
 I argue that, indeed, we may never know what drove 
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Voong to commit this murder-suicide: one, because, not only 
did he not leave a suicide note, which is what the article claims, 
but more so because no one has bothered to connect the dots 
of his life. There are clues, and by clues I mean the things that 
are mentioned in the article, but they didn’t resonate in any way 
except as tidbits about his life. But the clues are there: Voong’s 
father was a South Vietnamese soldier who spent years in a 
reeducation camp; after close to twenty years in the United States, 
Voong still struggled with English; he was chronically unemployed 
and lived in subsidized housing alongside other refugees from 
Bosnia, Iraq, and Somalia; and he claimed to be a victim of a string 
of police taunting and torture that chased him from California to 
New York.
 Although newspaper reporters recounted Voong’s story 
as an isolated incident committed by a “delusional” man, his 
life accounts make visible the connections between U.S. war in 
Southeast Asia, language and anti-immigrant discrimination, 
urban poverty and police brutality in the United States. In other 
words, this murder-suicide occurred not in a vacuum, but at the 
intersection of local, national and international acts of racialized 
violence.
 This is the methodology that I’m using in this talk and 
throughout the book. It revolves around what I term “critical 
juxtaposing”—the deliberate bringing together of seemingly 
different historical events in an effort to reveal what would 
otherwise remain invisible: the contours, contents and limits of 
the U.S. empire. In this case, I am bringing together Voong’s life 
in Vietnam, his life in the U.S., his experiences with the police, 
his experiences with language discrimination, to insist that these 
things are connected. I call this critical juxtaposing, and I am 
stringing all these things together purposefully and to make a 
point.
 It is definitely about connecting the dots. And I want 
to stress that this is not the same as what social scientists call 
comparative projects. The traditional comparative method, I 
argue, conceptualizes groups, events or places to be discrete, 
already-constituted entities. If we are comparing African 
Americans and Vietnamese Americans, for example, we tend 
to assume that we know who belongs in which category. I am 
arguing instead that their identities are, in fact, fluid rather than 
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more complex than is assumed in 
the classical dichotomies of the 
historical materialist canon. 
static and are always in formation. But most importantly, they 
need to be understood in relation to each other and within the 
context of a flexible political discourse. To get at this we need a 
methodology of relationality, to see that groups are relationally 
constructed, nations are relationally constructed, men and 
women are relationally constructed and wealth and poverty are 
relationally constructed. They are not discrete entities that have 
always existed.
 I want to step back for a minute to talk about the book 
Body Counts—why I wrote it and the questions that I raised. I 
became interested in writing this book not because I wanted 
to write about the Vietnam War. In fact, even though I came 
from Vietnam, for a long time, I didn’t know how to write about 
the war and the Vietnamese refugees. In the U.S., Vietnamese 
refugees were always seen as victims, people who frantically left 
Vietnam and then assimilated into U.S. society; and I didn’t know 
how to enter the conversation in a way that wouldn’t continue 
to replicate that narrative. I didn’t know how to write that story 
until the Iraq War, when I realized that I wanted to write about 
U.S. militarism and to use the refugee as a lens through which to 
understand how militarism works. 
 The ethical and political questions for me were and 
continue to be: why do certain killings of racialized bodies not lead 
to an ethical crisis? Why do certain nations continue to be able to 
engage in war, seemingly without consequences? Or, to ask Judith 
Butler’s question, what makes for a grievable life? In thinking 
about Iraqi refugees and Iraqi and Vietnamese lives specifically, 
why are certain lives more “grievable” than others (Butler 2009)?
 For me, the questions that arose were: How has the United 
States been able to fold the Vietnam War, a controversial war 
that it lost, into a list of eventual war triumphs through to the 
end of the twentieth century? How have U.S. actions in Vietnam 
been re-presented to be not only “successful”, but also “just” 
and even “necessary”? To answer these questions, I argue that 
we need to bring together Vietnam War studies and refugee 
studies. U.S. scholarship has largely separated war studies and 
refugee studies into different fields of study. This decoupling 
obscures the formative role that U.S. wars play in structuring 
the displacement, dispersion and migration of refugees to the 
United States and elsewhere. In Body Counts, I juxtapose refugee 
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studies and war studies and contend that it is the presence of 
Vietnamese refugees that enables the United States to recast 
its aggressive military actions as a benevolent intervention. I 
thus situate my discussion of Vietnamese refugees not at the 
moment of flight or at the moment of rescue, which is how 
Vietnamese tend to come into American consciousness, or even 
at the moment of U.S. involvement in Vietnam. Rather, I situate 
them within a specific frame of reference: the long, long durée 
of U.S. military colonialism in the Asia-Pacific region. I argue 
that the refugees are widely publicized objects of U.S. rescue 
fantasy, the people that the U.S. have evacuated and resettled. 
As such, Vietnamese refugees, whose war sufferings remain 
unmentionable and unmourned in most U.S. public discussions of 
the Vietnam War, have ironically become the featured evidence of 
the appropriateness of U.S. actions in Vietnam: that the war, no 
matter the cost, was ultimately necessary, just and successful.
 To back up a bit, this work emerged out of a conversation 
that I had with my colleague Lisa Yoneyama, who is now at the 
University of Toronto. Her work has consistently shown the power 
of the master narratives of the Second World War—in which 
the U.S. allegedly rescued desperate people from tyrannical 
governments and reformed them “into free and advanced citizens 
of the postwar democratic world” (Yoneyama 2005: 886). In the 
context of Asia, the Second World War became a moment when 
the U.S. entered world history, triumphantly, and claimed credit 
for “rescuing” and “rehabilitating” a number of Asian countries 
including Japan, South Korea and so on. I was thinking that this 
master narrative did not work in the Vietnam case because the 
U.S. can’t point to Vietnam and say that it has liberated the 
country, since the U.S. lost the war and Vietnam became and 
remains a socialist country. That was a puzzle that I wanted to 
solve. I wanted to understand how the U.S. was able to explain 
and explain away not only its defeat in Vietnam, but also its 
eventual ability to claim victory in Vietnam. I argue that in the 
absence of a liberated Vietnam and people, the U.S. has produced 
a substitute: the freed and reformed Vietnamese refugees.
 Many people are familiar with the iconic image of the U.S. 
rescuing frantic Vietnamese from the top of a building near the 
U.S. embassy via helicopter in Saigon in April 1975 (see Figure 
1). Such iconic images of the Vietnamese scrambling to escape 
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communist Vietnam, I argue, have discursively and visually 
transformed the Vietnamese from a people battered by decades 
of U.S. warfare in Vietnam to those only persecuted by the 
Communist government and rescued by the U.S. In this sense, 
while refugees have often been represented as a problem for the 
U.S.—for its mental health institutions, schools, work places—I 
argue that they constitute a solution for the U.S. because they 
have become the featured evidence of the appropriateness of U.S. 
actions in Vietnam, thus allowing the U.S. to recast its aggressive 
military strategy as a benevolent intervention. The term “refuge”, 
which in this case is the U.S., and the term “refugees” are thus 
mutually constituted. If the U.S. can re-present itself as a refuge, 
then it can discursively move itself away from being a war 
aggressor. 
 I then charted the field of what I call “critical refugee 
studies,” a term which I will summarize at the end of the talk. 
Essentially what I wanted to do was to (re)conceptualize “the 
refugee” in academic discussion and popular discourse not as 
an object of rescue, but rather as a paradigm “whose function 
[is] to establish and make intelligible a wider set of problems” 
(Agamben 2002: 1) such as colonialization, war and displacement. 
Instead of looking at Vietnamese refugees as people that we 
assimilate and make into a success or continue to see as a 
problem, I argue that we should look at them as a critical site of 
social and political critique. As you trace their lives, other erased 
histories will become visible, like the history of U.S. colonialism 
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Figure 1. Vietnamese civilians 
trying to board a U.S. helicopter 
near the U.S. embassy in Saigon, 
1975. (Hugh Van Es) © Bettmann/
CORBIS
in the Philippines and military colonialism in the Pacific Islands, 
and so on. This is the idea that if you resurrect the history of 
the displacement and flight of the Vietnamese people, you will 
simultaneously call attention to other histories that have been 
systematically erased.
 I am going to now talk about two concepts: “military 
colonialism” and “militarized refuge”. I do a lot of my work quite 
intuitively, and it derives from personal stories, often from my 
students or from people who attend my talks. I think about “why 
would this be the case?” and then try to think about how one 
might theorize from a personal anecdote. So the ideas for this 
chapter emerged from my own story of leaving Vietnam and 
coming to the United States. 
 Here, I deal with a group that is referred to as the first-
wave Vietnamese refugees—those who left soon after the Fall of 
Saigon in April 1975. I left Vietnam with my mother in 1975 on 
one of the military aircrafts that the U.S. provided. We travelled 
from Saigon, Vietnam to Clark Air Force Base in the Philippines. 
From there we went to Anderson Air Force Base in Guam and 
eventually to Camp Pendleton in California. I didn’t realize until 
later that over 40 per cent of the Vietnamese who were airlifted 
out by the U.S. and eventually landed in the U.S. took this very 
same route as my mom and I did. 
 What did these geographic points on our journey have in 
common? The commonality was that they were all military bases, 
and this is the quickest summary of what I call militarized refuge. 
I thought, “Gosh, I’ve been doing ethnic studies for 25 years and 
I didn’t recognize the significance of this pattern.” I’ve told this 
story of my flight over and over again, about how we got here, and 
I just saw it as going from place to place, almost randomly. I never 
thought seriously about which places we landed at and why, and 
the fact that we went through all of these different military bases. 
It’s not an accidental, random route or something that we just 
came up with. This particular refugee route could have only been 
possible with the long history of U.S. military interventions in Asia, 
dating all the way back to 1898, and I would argue even before 
then if you think about settler colonialism in the Americas, which 
made possible U.S. military overtures overseas in the first place.
 I wanted to think very seriously about what it means 
to have these military bases be called “refugee centres”. The 
8
Asia Colloquia Papers Vol. 06 No. 02 // 2016
simultaneity of violence and recovery is something that I am 
really interested in. In the very space touted as the one in which 
Vietnamese were being rescued and showered with affection, 
benevolence and so on, was the very same space from where 
the war in Vietnam was launched and made possible. I came up 
with this term “militarized refuge”—with its intended jarring 
juxtaposition—in order to challenge the powerful narrative of 
America(ns) rescuing and caring for Vietnam’s discarded that 
erases the role that U.S. foreign policy and war played in inducing 
the “refugee crisis” in the first place. To make a case against U.S. 
militarism, I argue that we need to expose the militarized violence 
behind the humanitarian ideas of refuge and refugees. That’s 
the intention behind the term in the book’s title: “militarized 
refuge(es)”.  
 Another term that I want to call attention to is “military 
colonialism”. In my department, Ethnic Studies at the University 
of California, San Diego, we take issues of indigeneity really 
seriously, and so settler colonialism is a key lens through which 
we understand how power works. But I also think that there are 
places around the world where colonial powers don’t necessarily 
settle, except militarily. So I coined the term “military colonialism” 
to describe these militarized spaces, particularly in the Pacific 
Islands. I’m very interested in Guam and even Hawai’i (even 
though Hawai’i is now considered part of the U.S.) as places that 
continue to be considered primarily sites to house U.S. military 
personnel and weapons. The Philippines at one point in time was 
also very much a subject of military colonialism. It is important 
for us to theorize about the specificity of militarized colonized 
spaces, in addition to thinking about settler colonialism and about 
colonies in general.
 In Body Counts, I am concerned with displacing the 
dominant memory of the U.S. as a masculine and benevolent 
state, not only by pointing out that it disavows U.S. imperial wars 
in Asia, but also because it creates and solidifies a humanitarian 
discourse that permits the justification of U.S. wars in the Middle 
East and West Asia and Afghanistan, and rationalizes the further, 
continual militarization of Asia and the Pacific Islands. I think 
that the Pacific Islands are really the hub that enables so much 
of what happened in Asia militarily. And it’s really a space that 
ideologically has been emptied. I’ll talk a little bit more about that 
9
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later on.  
 Going back to the airlifted refugees in April 1975, you may 
recall that the Americans were very self-congratulatory about 
how much work they were able to do in such a short time, to 
move all these refugees, like myself, and encamp them at military 
bases throughout the Pacific archipelago. And, true, it was an 
enormous undertaking if you think about it: moving over 100,000 
refugees in a matter of days and trying to find places to house 
them. The logistics were quite overwhelming, even mind-blowing. 
What I realized was that they were able to accomplish this feat 
because there was already an infrastructure in place – a military 
infrastructure. I contend that it was the region’s neo-colonial 
dependence on the U.S. that turned the Philippines and Guam, 
the U.S.’s former and current colonial territories respectively, into 
the “ideal” receiving centres of the U.S. rescuing project. 
 The Philippines, for example, initially agreed to accept the 
Vietnamese, but eventually refused to accept any more refugees, 
thus foreclosing the most promising staging area in the Asia-
Pacific region. Even though the Philippines was a former colonial 
territory, by this time it was a sovereign nation and could in fact 
say “no” to the U.S. In contrast, when U.S. officials moved the 
premier refugee staging area from the Philippines to Guam, the 
Chamorro people (of Guam) did not have the same ability to 
refuse. As an unincorporated organized territory of the United 
States, the federal government holds plenary powers—that is, full 
authority—over the island. On an island where the U.S. military 
controlled one-third of its territory, Guam became the “logical” 
transit camps for the processing of evacuees. Recently, I wrote a 
paper on collateral damage of the Vietnam War, where I argue 
that collateral damage was imposed on the “other Others”, in 
this case the Chamorros, because of the Vietnam War. I didn’t 
think about it until recently, what it must have meant for the local 
populations, for all these Vietnamese to all of a sudden descend 
on this very, very small island, straining the already-strained 
infrastructure such as water, food, transportation and so on. So I 
think about the costs to the indigenous people of Guam also as 
the collateral damage of the Vietnam War.
 To sum up this section, I argue that it was the enormity 
of the military buildup in the Pacific that uniquely equipped the 
U.S. bases to handle the large-scale refugee rescue operation. 
10
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Thus U.S. evacuation efforts were not a slapdash response, as 
they often say, to an emergency situation that arose in Vietnam 
in 1975, but rather part and parcel of the longstanding militarized 
histories and circuits that connected Vietnam, the Philippines 
and Guam, dating back to 1898. So again, that’s what I mean by 
military colonialism.
 In particular, the U.S. decision to designate the island of 
Guam as the primary staging ground for the refugees, even when 
the island’s resources were severely stressed and its inhabitants 
adversely impacted, repeats the longstanding belief that 
indigenous land is essentially empty land, that is, land empty of its 
indigenous population. In some ways, the U.S. carpet-bombing of 
Vietnam was also symptomatic of that empty-land mentality—a 
flagrant dismissiveness of the country as “a worthless piece of 
land,” as characterized by an American official (Dunnaway 2008: 
119). This type of military colonization, that of a colonized island 
and its indigenous inhabitants, turned this island into an ideal 
colonial dumping ground for the unwanted Vietnamese refugees, 
the collateral damage of the Vietnam War.
 I wanted to just mention one more space: Marine Corps 
Base Camp Pendleton in California. All of the Vietnamese refugees 
who arrived in the U.S. in 1975 were first sent to military bases, 
one of which was Camp Pendleton. What I want to call attention 
to is the fact that Camp Pendleton also emerged out of a history of 
conquest: it is located in the traditional territory of the Juaneno, 
Luiseno and Kumeyaay tribes, which had been “discovered” 
by Spanish padres and voyagers who traveled to southern 
California in the late eighteenth century. Then it was “owned” by 
unscrupulous Anglo-American settlers for about a century. It was 
eventually “acquired” by the U.S. Marine Corps in 1942 in order 
to establish a West Coast base for combat training. The camp is 
about 17 miles long; its shoreline is prized land, and it’s beautiful. 
However, this buried past, of the “stolen land” has continued 
to surface, sometimes literally, in the form of the inadvertent 
discoveries of native burials and human bone fragments. In short, 
this particular refuge space for the Vietnamese refugees, Camp 
Pendleton, was also enabled by settler colonialism.  
 In moving from one U.S. military base to another through 
this Asia-Pacific route, Vietnamese refugees witnessed firsthand 
the shaping of the U.S. empire in the Asia-Pacific region. This is 
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what I mean by looking at, theoretically, the Vietnamese refugee 
as a site of political critique, versus as an object of rescue. By 
tracing the routing of the Vietnamese refugees, this inadvertently 
exposes U.S. colonialism, settler colonialism and militarism, 
because these are the spaces in which they landed. Just looking at 
the list of military bases that doubled up as refugee camps would 
allow you to see these connections.   
 The second term I use is “militarized refuge”. While I 
recognize the value of conceptualizing war as a “knowledge 
project or epistemology” (Kim 2010: 8), I also believe that 
we need to continue to think of war in terms of “militarized 
violence”—not only epistemic or symbolic violence but the 
actual physical violence of “guns and bombs” unleashed on those 
deemed to be devoid of names and faces, family and personal 
histories, and politics and beliefs. 
 I am going to give you some quick examples. Clark Air 
Force Base in the Philippines provided crucial logistical support for 
U.S. wars in Southeast Asia. This would be the place where you’d 
land to get refueled. When the United States was not permitted 
to mount B-52 bombing runs from Clark, however, it turned to 
Guam. Andersen Air Force Base in Guam played a “legendary role” 
in the Vietnam War, launching a monthly bombing mission over 
North and South Vietnam for about a decade (Rogers 1995: 252). 
Andersen rapidly became the largest U.S. base for B-52 bombers. 
In such a small space, everything on Guam was completely 
militarized: personnel, weapons, bases, even culture. 
 In 1972, Andersen was the site of the most massive 
buildup of airpower in history, with more than 15,000 crews and 
over 150 B-52s lining all available flight line space—about five 
miles long on an island that is just 20 miles long.  It’s interesting 
to think about space and how it’s used. At its peak, Andersen 
housed around 165 B-52s (Rogers 1995: 252). During Operation 
Linebacker II in 1972 (named after Nixon’s favorite sport: American 
football!), bombers stationed at Andersen flew 729 sorties around 
the clock over 11 days. On December 18, 87 B-52s were launched 
from Andersen to Vietnam in less than two hours. Please keep 
this in mind when you think about Vietnamese refugees being 
relocated and encamped into these very same spaces in 1975.
 Back in California, Camp Pendleton is the home base of 
the illustrious 1st Marine Regiment. While I won’t go into details, 
they are called the 1st Marine Regiment, whose battalions began 
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arriving in Vietnam in August 1965. The regiment’s battalions, who 
are the most vicious and well-trained in hand-to-hand combat, 
participated in some of the most ferocious battles of the war. 
Between January and March 1968, in the city of Hue, the 1st 
Marines, along with other U.S. Marine and South Vietnamese 
units, killed close to 2,000 “enemies” in street fighting and hand-
to-hand combat. The regiment continued heavy fighting through 
the rest of the year, which culminated in Operation Meade River, 
which killed nearly 850 Vietnamese. I recently learned that the 
general who ran this combat operation, General Paul Graham, 
was also the man who directed the resettlement efforts of the 
refugees at Camp Pendleton, further blurring violence and 
recovery into each other. Indeed, Graham’s illustrious career, his 
promotions and recognitions, were built in large part on the role 
that he played in executing both the violence against and the 
recovery of Vietnamese bodies.
 In sum, I have argued that Pacific military bases, Clark and 
Andersen Air Force bases, and California’s Marine Corps Base 
Camp Pendleton, which were credited and valourized for resettling 
Vietnamese refugees in 1975, were the very sites responsible for 
inducing the refugee displacement in the first place. The massive 
tonnage of bombs, along with the ground fighting provided by 
Marine units like Camp Pendleton’s 1st Marines, displaced some 
12 million people in South Vietnam, almost half the country’s total 
population at that time, from their homes.
 This is a really nice map that one of my graduate students, 
Ly Nguyen, did for me (see Figure 2). You can see at the top, the 
red line is the U.S. military going to the different spaces that I’ve 
mentioned, and then the bottom line, the blue line, depicts 
Figure 2 – Map of the routing of 
U.S. military and weapons to Asia 
and of the “return” of Vietnamese 
refugees to the U.S. (Ly Nguyen) 
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the Vietnamese going back to the U.S. It is a very visual way of 
thinking about what happened. I remember taking a taxi in the 
U.S. once and the driver was Moroccan and we engaged in a 
conversation about imperialism. The driver shared with me that 
before he came to the U.S. he was in France, a country that had 
colonized Morocco. He spoke about the youth riots that were 
taking place in France at the time, whose participants were mostly 
immigrant kids. He said to me, “you know, the French went to 
Morocco and took all of our access, and we just followed our 
access back to France.” This map is another example of this: of 




 I want to end with an image that visually depicts what 
I’m trying to say about militarized refuge. This is a photograph 
from the Camp Pendleton Historical Society photo exhibit in 2010 
(see Figure 3), which was the thirtieth anniversary of the fall of 
Saigon. Dated May 5, 1975, it depicts several Vietnamese children 
walking barefoot around the Camp, their whole bodies engulfed 
in extra-long military jackets. Undoubtedly, the gesture was 
meant to be kind and the jacket intended to warm their bodies 
against the morning cold—it was very cold for Vietnamese, even 
in California. Yet this picture, I would say, encapsulates so vividly 
the concept of militarized refuge(es), with young Vietnamese 
Figure 3 – Young Vietnamese 
refugee children walk through one 
of the refugee camps aboard Camp 
Pendleton, California. Photo taken 
on 5 May 1975 by Major G. L. Gill. 
(Photo courtesy of Camp Pendleton 
Archives). 
bodies literally wrapped in U.S. protective military gear as they 
wandered the grounds of their new home in America—a military 
base that housed the very same 1st Marines who had waged 
war in Vietnam, leaving high numbers of combat deaths in 
their wake. The military jackets for me symbolize the unsettling 
entanglement between military acts of violence that I mentioned 
earlier, with recovery literally overlaying and at times disappearing 
the memory of violence. Here the jackets literally overlaid and 
disappeared the young refugees.
 Grafting the colonial histories of the Philippines, Guam and 
the Pacific Islands and the ongoing displacement of indigenous 
populations onto the history of the Vietnam War also debunks the 
misguided nostalgia for a “gentler America”—a time of national 
unity, purity and innocence—that supposedly preceded the U.S. 
military involvement in Vietnam, a sentiment that blatantly denies 
the reality of a bloody, divisive and disruptive history that included 
genocide, slavery, lynching, war, the atomic bomb and Agent 
Orange.
 This methodology of grafting—of connecting the dots, 
critical juxtaposing—offers the promise that even deliberately 
discarded histories—such as colonialism in the Philippines, settler 
colonialism, military colonialism, and also Vietnamese lives and 
stories—will continue to be told as they bump against, intersect 
with, and route through the lives of kin communities. 
 To conclude, what I’ve tried to do in this book is to develop 
a different way of looking at refugees, one that conceptualizes 
“the refugee” as an analytic for critical inquiry rather than as 
a traumatized object of study; as a site of political and social 
critique, their lives, when traced, make visible the linked processes 
of colonialism, war and displacement.
 Second, critical refugee studies, I think, also helps us to 
expose the militarized violence behind the humanitarian idea 
of refuge, to reveal the humanitarian violence that undergirds a 
rescue/liberation project.
 Third is the connection between militarism and migration. 
I really think that if you map migration on top of militarism and on 
top of colonialism, they would match up. This kind of layering—of 
colonialism, militarism and migration—is absolutely important 
because it challenges the myth of immigrant America—the push 
and pull narrative of desperate individuals searching for liberty, 
searching for the promised land. This narrative constitutes the 
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Grafting the colonial histories of 
the Philippines, Guam and the 
Pacific Islands and the ongoing 
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populations onto the history of 
the Vietnam War also debunks the 
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involvement in Vietnam …
underlying logic of anti-immigrant rhetoric and practices, and 
makes invisible or un-visible the role that U.S. militarism has 
played in the global structures of migration.
 I will end here. As we now witness the continuing 
movements of refugees around the world, with Syrian refugees 
being the most visible in the media now, and as scholars 
interested in social change, it’s imperative that we take a very 
different sort of responsibility for the global conditions of justice, 
not only to attempt to integrate the world’s dispossessed, but also 
to critically delineate and evaluate the policies and practices that 
produce displaced conditions in the first place.  
 
Asia Colloquia Papers Vol. 06 No. 02 // 2016
16
Dr. Le Espiritu gave the Asia Lecture on 8 October 2015 at York
University in Toronto, Canada.
17
Please cite this paper as:
Espiritu, Yen Le (2016). “Vietnam, the Philippines, Guam and 
California: Connecting the Dots of U.S. Military Empire”. Asia 
Colloquia Papers 6(2). Toronto: York Centre for Asian Research. 
Available at: www.yorku.ca/ycar. 
ISBN: 978-1-5501-4644-8
© Yen Le ESPIRITU
Asia Colloquia Papers Vol. 06 No. 02 // 2016
MORE ABOUT THE AUTHOR
Dr. Yen Le Espiritu is Professor and former Chair of the 
Department of Ethnic Studies at the University of California, 
San Diego. An award winning author, she has published widely 
on Asian American panethnicity, gender and migration, and 
on U.S. colonialism and wars in Asia. Her books include Home 
Bound: Filipino Lives Across Countries, Communities and 
Cultures (University of California Press, 2003), Asian American 
Women and Men: Labor, Laws and Love (Rowman and 
Littlefield, 2008) and most recently Body Counts: The Vietnam 
War and Militarized Refuge(es) (University of California Press, 
2014).
ABOUT YCAR
The York Centre for Asian Research (YCAR) was 
established in 2002 to promote research on Asia and 
Asian Diaspora at York University. The Centre brings 
together a community of Asian scholars at York and 
beyond and enhances the profile for Asian and Asian 
Diaspora research outside of York. York University 
has a strong contingent of Asia and Asian diaspora 
researchers. Its membership includes faculty and 
students from across the campus, including Liberal 
Arts & Professional Studies, Fine Arts, Environmental 
Studies, Education, Osgoode Law School and the 
Schulich School of Business. Geographically, YCAR is 
organized around four “legs”: East Asia, Southeast 
Asia, South Asia and Asian Diaspora.
As a research centre, YCAR's takes an expansive 
approach to Asian Studies, consistent with evolving 
ideas about the meaning and role of area studies in 
a globalizing world. The Centre organizes workshops, 
seminars and other research dissemination activities 
on topics like the history of Asian societies and their 
interconnections, political dimensions of transna-
tionalism among immigrant communities in Canada, 
transnational religious networks, Asian environ-
ments, democratization and human rights in Asia, 
and Asian arts and performance. Our research activi-
ties and publications have enabled YCAR to form 
links with government bodies, community groups 
and business organizations as well as researchers 
around the world. 
ABOUT ASIA COLLOQUIA PAPERS
The Asia Colloquia Papers Series is published by 
the York Centre for Asian Research (YCAR) at York 
University, Toronto, Canada. The series aims to make 
available to wider audiences the content of selected 
lectures, seminars and other talks presented at or in 
association with YCAR. As such, the Asia Colloquia 
Papers have few or no footnotes. The Series is pub-
lished in electronic text form and occasionally also 
as an audio or visual file. It is available on the York 
Centre for Asian Research web site at:
www.yorku.ca/ycar
The views in the Asia Colloquia Papers Series are 
those of the author(s) alone and do not necessarily 
reflect those of YCAR or its members. The copyright 
for the paper content remains with the author(s). 
Anyone wishing to republish, reprint or reproduce 
any portion of the paper in any form, including in 
translation, may do so only with the author(s) ex-
pressed, prior, written permission. The copyright for 
the image of the papers remains with the York Cen-
tre for Asian Research and may not be reproduced in 
whole or in part in any form, including in translation, 
without the expressed, prior, written permission of 
the Centre.
For more information, please contact the York Centre 
for Asian Research at:
ycar@yorku.ca
18
Asia Colloquia Papers Vol. 06 No. 02 // 2016
